Abstract-As an effective solution to protect the privacy of the data, homomorphic encryption has become a hot research topic. Existing homomorphic schemes are not truly practical due to their huge key size. In this paper, we present a simple weakly homomorphic encryption scheme using only elementary modular arithmetic over the integers rather than working with ideal lattices. Compared with DGHV's construction, the proposed scheme has shorter public key and ciphertext size. The main appeal of our approach is the conceptual simplicity. We reduce the security of weakly homomorphic scheme to "learning divisor with noise (LDN)".
I. INTRODUCTION
After the discovery of public-key cryptography by Diffie and Hellman [1] in the year 1976, the necessity for total privacy of digital data has become stronger, especially since the internet has become an indispensable part of our private and work lives. One way to achieve confidentiality in various applications, such as online banking, electronic voting, virtual networks, etc., is homomorphic encryption scheme. The question for constructing such a scheme arose within a year of the development of RSA [2] . Rivest et al. [3] firstly proposed a beautiful idea saying that whether there exists an encryption scheme that permitting computation on encrypted data without decryption. In a nutshell, a fully homomorphic encryption scheme is an encryption scheme that allows a worker to perform arbitrary computations on encrypted data. At a high-level, the essence of fully homomorphic encryption is simple: given ciphertexts that encryption of 1 ,..., t mm , one can evaluate any desired (computation efficiently)function f on the ciphertexts, and outputs an evaluated ciphertext that encryption of the For more than 30 years, it was unclear whether fully homomorphic encryption was achievable or not. During this period, a novelty encryption system was proposed by the Boneh-Goh-Nissim [4] , which supported an unlimited number of addition operations but one multiplication at the most. In 2009 Gentry [5] [6] came up with the first construction of such a scheme based on ideal lattices. Soon after Gentry's initial paper appeared, Smart and Vercauteren [7] improved Gentry's scheme by shorten the key size and ciphertext size. In Asiacrypt'2010, Stehle and Steinfeld [8] proposed an improved scheme of Gentry's scheme, which introduced decryption errors to reduce computation cost. In Eurocrypt'2010, van Dijk et al. [9] proposed a simply homomorphic public-key encryption scheme, named as DGHV. The innovation in the scheme was the construction of a weakly homomorphic encryption scheme over integers instead of ideal lattices. Building on the work of DGHV, Coron et al. [10] [11] [12] proposed three new schemes, each of them was quite potential in improving the performance and thus suitable for applications. Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [13] [14] proposed two homomorphic encryption schemes based on the ring LWE problem [15] , in which security can be reduced to the worst-case hardness problem on ideal lattices. Xiao [16] and Ramaiah [17] also proposed two efficient homomorphic encryption schemes. In [18] , a simply homomorphic encryption scheme was proposed, which was useful for cloud computing. The previous works are described in table I. 
A. Our Results
Informally, one wants the homomorphicaly generated encryption of f m to be statistically close to the ciphertext corresponding to f m . We call the schemes that have this property strongly homomorphic. For some applications, it seems that strongly homomorphic encryption is overkill. We need weaker notion of homomorphic encryption that might be easier to construct and still suffice for these applications. The minimal requirement is that a homomorphically generated encryption can be decrypted correctly to the corresponding message. Unfortunately, the minimal requirement does not seem to be useful as is, because it captures schemes that we do not really consider to be homomorphic. Specifically, we call an encryption scheme weakly homomorphic if homomorphically generated ciphertexts can be decrypted correctly to the corresponding message, as well as their lengths only depend on the security parameters and the message length instead of the number of input ciphertexts. Hence, in this paper we mainly focus on the weakly homomorphic encryption.
Firstly, we propose a weakly homomorphic encryption scheme whose security is based solely on the hardness of learning divisor with noise (LDN). Secondly, inspired by [19] , we propose a technique, which can refresh the rough ciphertext and gets a new ciphertext with smaller noise. Thirdly, the private key homomorphic encryption scheme is transferred to its public key version. Compared with the previous works, the construction only use elementary modular arithmetic over the integers rather than working with ideal lattices. And it is simpler in pedagogical and theoretical. Note that, the paper concentrates on the weakly homomorphic scheme, as we think that the making it fully homomorphic procedure in [9] is straightforward.
B. Roadmap
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the notations and some definitions used throughout the paper. Section III proposes a weakly homomorphic encryption scheme over integers. Section IV proposes a clean procedure that refreshes the rough ciphertext. This technique significantly reduces the noise of ciphertext. Section V describes a conversion from the private key to public key. Section VI concludes this paper and gives some open problems.
Circular-Security. Unfortunately, during the Clean procedure, the security of rough scheme cannot guarantee. This notion is called circular security and it is a subclass of key dependent message (KDM) security. Using a common cryptographic technique -Sparse subset sum assumption (SSSP), the modified scheme in this paper is circular security.
II. PRELIMINARY
Notations. In this paper, the parameters of the scheme are denoted by Greek letters (e.g., ,, pqn etc.), particularly, n is the security parameter. The real number and integer are denoted by lowercase letters, and the set is denoted by capital letters. For a real number x , the upper and lower bound, and its nearest integer are denoted by
 respectively. Namely, these are the unique integers in the half open intervals ( 1, ] xx  , 
A. Hard Problem
Definition (Learning divisor with noise). The hardness assumption can be described as follows: let p a random n bit prime, R a random 3 n bit prime, and N pR  .
Given a set of integers 12 , ,... x x x  , which are chosen randomly close to multiples of a large integer p , and e is the "noise", output the "common near divisor" p .
Definition (Sparse subset sum assumption). Given m n -bit numbers 1 Definition (Discrete Statistical distance). It is a measure of distance between two discrete probability distributions and a useful tool in the analysis of randomized algorithms. X and Y are two discrete random variables over a set A . Define the Discrete Statistical Distance between X and Y as JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 9, NO. 6, JUNE 2014 1465
Definition (Weakly homomorphic encryption 
III. CONSTRUCTION

A. The Basic Scheme
Let n be the security parameter, and the message space is 2 . The parameter is similar to the DGHV's convenient parameter setting [9] .
(1 ) n sk
KeyGen
. We choose p to be a random n -bit prime, and R to be a random 
Following the Eq. (3) 
The absolute value of e for encryption is less than 2 n , p is a n -bit prime; we have 
C. Homomorphic
In this subsection, we formally discuss the homomorphic property of the proposed scheme. Clearly, since addition and multiplication form a complete set of operations, such a scheme enables performing any polynomial-time computation on encrypted data. Note that, for any two ciphertexts 1 c and 2 c , addition and multiplication operations are described as follows: addition: . By the triangle inequality, a d additive operations on ciphertexts increases the magnitude of the integers by a factor of d at most. However, one multiplicative operation on ciphertexts may square the magnitude of the integers, that's to say, double their bit-lengths. Clearly, the main influence of the homomorphic capacity is the multiplicative depth of the arithmetic circuit C . In addition, the scheme supports multiplications as long as the nosie of ciphertext is sufficiently smaller than /2 p . According to the parameter setting, we can conclude that 1466 JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 9, NO. 6, JUNE 2014 the scheme supports approximately n multiplications on ciphertexts.
D. Security
The security of the proposed scheme including two parts: CPA-security and key-security. For the private-key construction, key-security can be guaranteed. In this section, we mainly discuss the CPA-security, and the key-security of public-key construction will be discussed in section V.
Definition (CPA-security). A scheme HE is IND-CPA secure for any polynomial time adversary atk , Adv is the probability of atk guess the plaintext from ciphertexts, it holds that
Corollary. The scheme proposed in section III is CPAsecurity.
Proof 
We can conclude that the scheme proposed in section III is CPA-security.
IV. REDUCING THE NOISY
When two ciphertexts 1 c and 2 c are added ( c c c ), the noise term is squared. If the noise gets too large, the plaintext message becomes impossible to recover. In this section, we propose a technique that refreshes the rough ciphertext to obtain a refreshed ciphertext with small noise, named as "Clean". The technique does not change the previous encryption and decryption algorithms, and we just add a "hint" into the public parameters. Putting the hint 1 ,... m WW in Clean procedure induces another computational assumption, related to the SSSP. We can easily avoid some known attacks on the problem by choosing T large enough to avoid brute-force attacks. Thus, all the properties of the scheme (e.g. correctness, homomorphism) will be preserved. The implementation of Clean procedure is described as below.
A. The Implementation of Clean
Given 
JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. From a high-level point of view, the weakly public-key homomorphic scheme is constructed by first proposing a simple weakly private-key homomorphic scheme. The intuition for how to move from private to public key can be seen in a straightforward manner in the case of weakly homomorphic schemes. The following construction was suggested implicitly in [9] . Let sk Enc and sk Dec be the respective encryption and decryption algorithm of a weakly private-key encryption scheme. Suppose that this encryption scheme is weakly homomorphic w.r.t the identity function. That is, it is possible to re-randomize ciphertexts. Such a scheme can be used to construct a weakly public-key homomorphic scheme as follows. The secret key is the key of primal private key scheme, and the public key consists of an encryption of 0 (i.e.
sk Enc ). To encrypt a bit m , just randomize the ciphertext corresponding to m . To decrypt the ciphertext, apply the private-key decryption algorithm using sk . There is an additional parameter i r , which is the distance between the public key elements and the nearest multiples of the secret key p . (1 ) n pk KeyGen . We choose p to be a random n bit prime, and R to be a random guidance in completing this work. In particular, I would like to thank Prof. Shoushan Luo for many helpful guidance and constructive comments that helped present this work in a more coherent way. This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China, (Grant No. 61121061, 61161140320).
